




EUI Woricing Paper ECO No. 95/6
On the Nature o f Commitment in 
Flexible Target Zones and the 
Measurement o f Credibility: 
The 1993 ERM Crisis
R enzo G . A vesani, 
G iampiero M . G allo 
and
M ark Salmon





















































































































































































EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE 
ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT
EUI Working Paper ECO No. 95/6
On the Nature of Commitment in 
Flexible Target Zones and the 
Measurement of Credibility: 
The 1993 ERM Crisis
Ren zo  G. A v e s a n i, 
G iam piero  M. G a l lo  
and
Ma r k  Salm o n
University o f  Brescia,
University o f  Florence and 
The European University Institute, Florence, 
andCEPR
Wp 330  
EUR
February 21,1995
This paper draws on and applies ideas from our earlier paper On the Evolution o f  Credibility and Flexible 
Target Zones that was presented, amongst other places, at the conference on European Currency Crises 
and After, LARE, University Bordeaux I, July 1994.




























































































No part o f  this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission o f  the authors.
©  Renzo G. Avesani, Giampiero M. Gallo and Mark Salmon 
Printed in Italy in March 1995 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 





























































































In this paper we consider the issues of the nature of the initial commit­
ment to an exchange rate target zone and how to construct an incentive 
compatible or sustainable band for exchange rates that depends endoge­
nously on the evolution of credibility in the system. The critical issue 
regarding sustainability rests on how the policy maker reacts to the con­
tinuous trade-off he faces between flexibility and credibility and hence 
in the market’s belief as to the policy maker’s commitment and ability 
to maintain the announced target zone. We apply the notion of relative 
credibility developed in Avesani, Gallo and Salmon [1994] and Svensson’s 
“simplest measure” of target zone credibility [1991] to the experience of 
the French Franc in the period up to the crisis of July/August 1993 and 
compare these measures with newspaper accounts of perceived credibility 
over the same period.























































































































































































Some ten years ago John Williamson [1983,1985] proposed a system of target 
zones for the world’s major currencies that differs in fundamental respects from 
that established in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European 
Monetary System1. The effective collapse of the ERM between September 1992 
and August 1993 has raised obvious questions regarding the objectives it was 
designed to serve and hence how the system could be reformed. It has also raised 
questions as to the viability of target zone systems in general but in this respect 
the recent experience within the ERM must surely have had the positive impact 
of emphasising the critical role of policy coordination (as consistently argued for 
by Williamson) alongside the constraint imposed by the target zone on exchange 
rates. It can also be argued that the lack of flexibility that demonstrably led 
to the eventual collapse of the ERM arose, somewhat paradoxically, because 
its original objectives of providing a zone of financial stability had become 
inconsistent with and subjugated to the movement towards European Monetary 
Union. The ERM became in effect, not a mechanism for stabilising exchange 
rates but more a surrogate and indirect device for enforcing convergence in those 
economies that would seek to join a European Monetary Union. Little or no 
evidence seems to exist that explicit coordination of policies took place external 
to the ERM.
Williamson’s original target zone proposal differs from that established in 
the ERM in two essential respects;
(i) The central parity in Williamson’s proposal would coincide with the “ fun­
damental equilibrium exchange rate” (FEER) which would be expected to 
move over time rather than some target parity that in the event remained 
fixed until a crisis forced a realignment. The FEER was defined in real 
terms and it was envisaged that relatively frequent and small realignments 
would be necessary to accommodate movements in the fundamentals.
(ii) The bands of the zone, “the soft buffers” , would be wide enough apart 
to achieve a desired degree of stabilisation with a relatively weak com­
mitment towards a “partial direction of monetary policy to discourage the 
exchange rate from straying outside its target zone” .



























































































In contrast, the ERM was based on relatively narrow band-widths for nom­
inal exchange rates together with the strict obligation to intervene to prevent 
movement outside the band. The interventions were supposed to be mandatory 
and bilateral at the margin and discretionary intramarginally. The relative 
fixity of the nominal target or central parity, the narrow bands and the require­
ment to intervene ensured that the ERM became an inflexible and rigid tool 
for stabilising exchange rates in the face of real shocks let alone for achieving 
convergence. Williamson’s proposal, on the other hand, would seem to have 
explicitly recognised the need for flexibility to accommodate the evolution of 
the credibility in the system and effects of adjusting to temporary asymmetric 
shocks, (see Williamson [1985] and Williamson and Miller [1987]).
This contrast between Williamson’s notion of a Target Zone and that 
implemented in the ERM was highlighted in The Economist after the ERM 
came under pressure following the September 1992 crisis when the Lira and 
the Pound dropped out of the system. For instance, an article in the May 8th 
1993 issue suggested, some three months before the 1993 crisis, that although 
the experience during 1992 was due to exceptional circumstances (the German 
unification process), it showed that deep changes in the way the ERM operated 
were required. In particular the need for more flexibility was stressed together 
with the need for wider bands, soft buffers at the edges in order to allow for 
temporary excursions from the band and the adoption of a policy of frequent 
realignments in order to compensate for inflation differentials; this last aspect 
being tantamount to establishing a band for the real exchange rate.
A reply to this article came some weeks later (on June 5th) with a let­
ter by Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz criticising the feasibility of the 
“Williamson- Economist" proposal and suggesting the need to regulate forex 
markets by adopting a version of the Tobin’s taxes or “sand in the wheels” 
proposal (Tobin [1978]) that financial institutions taking open positions in the 
forex should be required to keep non interest bearing deposits with Central 
Banks. Eichengreen and Wyplosz stressed that this suggestion would not pre­
vent a crisis from taking place but would simply buy the time necessary for 
the Central Bank to engineer an orderly realignment. They also argue that the 
proposal for a more flexible system would undermine credibility suggesting that 
“nobody will believe that governments are likely to intervene when exchange 
rates move toward the edge of their bands” .
In a companion paper, Avesani, Gallo and Salmon [1994] (AGS), we have 
developed a model of a flexible target zone which captures much of the spirit of 




























































































in the face of an attack, as Eichengreen-Wyplosz suggest, the monetary author­
ity acts strategically, potentially well in advance of the attack and although it 
may, in time, realign it will do so as part of an optimal strategy given that it has 
monitored its credibility and recognises that the existing band widths are no 
longer sustainable. Credibility will not necessarily be lost in practice by being 
flexible, in this sense, but it will be lost by attempting to defend an unsustain­
able band. We show in that paper that substantial exchange rate stabilisation 
may in fact be achieved by adopting a target zone management strategy that 
explicitly reflects credibility contrary to the point of view put forward by Barry 
Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz. It is important to note that this is achieved 
by a clear commitment to consistently and continuously defend the announced 
band but the commitment also recognises the importance of credibility and the 
need to maintain a required degree of credibility. Since credibility is not com­
pletely lost if the exchange rate passes over the band limit and if the authorities 
can be seen to be active in maintaining the band then credibility may well be 
recovered and a realignment avoided. In this sense the AGS model provides a 
relatively weak commitment to defend the band limits themselves and this is 
similar to the form of commitment suggested by Williamson and quoted above 
and quite unlike the rigid and inflexible commitment imposed on the ERM. The 
central issues lie in the endogenous evolution of partial credibility in the target 
zone and how the policy maker responds as his commitment is tested and how 
he trades off the desire for flexibility against a potential loss in credibility. The 
model essentially develops a target zone strategy that rests on a commitment 
to a feedback rule rather than the open loop precommitment that has been im­
plemented in the ERM and in the Bretton Woods System. The dependence on 
such open loop strategies both in practice and theory would seem to have rested 
on the misplaced belief that only such policies would be credible and stabilise 
exchange rates. Notice that this does not mean that capital controls of the form 
suggested by Eichengreen and Wyplosz should not also be implemented as part 
of the flexible feedback strategy. Indeed a mechanism to include processes that 
slow down the financial markets ability to respond to current events is included 
in the AGS model.
The dynamics of credibility necessarily involves learning and the resolu­
tion of uncertainty by the markets regarding the policymaker’s commitment 
and ability to defend the announced band and the hence the importance for 
the policymaker to monitor the target zone’s credibility in the day-to-day op­
eration of intervention policy within the band. This is the question we address 




























































































period leading up to the ERM crisis in 1993. In Section(2) we briefly present 
the flexible target zone model of Avesani, Gallo and Salmon [1994]. Section(3) 
discusses three measures of credibility which are then compared over the 1993 
crisis period. The first is a qualitative measure based on the historical evi­
dence collected from the views expressed in various issues of The Economist 
which we treat as reflecting informed opinion in the market; the second is the 
computation of the “simplest measure” of target zone credibility, suggested by 
Svensson [1991], which is based on forward exchange rates or rates of return 
and the final measure is based on the concept of relative credibility put forward 
by AGS. Our empirical results show that the latter measure closely shadows the 
press accounts, whereas the Svensson measure tends to signal losses of credibil­
ity that are not accompanied by realignments and hence its power to predict 
realignments is likely to be low.
2 The AGS Flexible Target Zone Model
with the fundamentals k(t) following a controlled Brownian motion process, 
with control being exerted when the fundamentals hit either limit of the implied 
band imposed on them. From (1), it is clear that the policy maker can affect the 
determination of the exchange rate in two ways: the first is directly through the 
fundamentals (i.e. through unsterilised intervention), the second is by modifying 
the markets’ expectations. The imposition of an upper and a lower limit on the 
fundamentals brings about the honeymoon effect and the typical S-shaped curve 
for the fundamentals/exchange rate mapping of the Krugman model, Krugman 
[1991],
This basic model suggests a rigid target zone where full credibility of the 
band limits is assumed ex ante. Extensions to include imperfect credibility ( see 
for instance, Krugman [1991], Pesenti[1990] and Bertola and Caballero [1992]) 
have generally assumed a probability <j> that the policy market will defend the 
zone at edge of the band and a probability 1 — <j> that he will not defend and 
that a realignment of the central parity would be needed. Thus there is always 
an expectation of a devaluation which depends on the exogenously given <j>. 
It is crucial to recall that in this extension of the model interventions would





























































































occur only at the edge of the band and hence at that limit one would get 
unambiguous information about the commitment of monetary authorities to 
defend the announced band. If intervention occurs then the fully credible path 
remains valid, otherwise there is an immediate attack and a jump to a free float 
regime.
Historically experience within the ERM has been different: interventions 
occur intramarginally and credibility is not evaluated by the markets only on 
the basis of what happens at the edges of the band but seems to follow more 
complex mechanisms. The events in the ERM in the Summer and Autumn 
of 1992 indicate the importance of credibility in determining the sustainability 
of a target zone and the need for the authorities to continuously monitor their 
credibility. These implications seem to point to the fact that instead of delaying 
the moment of the crisis as in the Eichengreen and Wyplozs proposal, there is 
room for implementing a more farsighted and flexible management strategy in 
a target zone that may consciously preempt the crisis, i.e. a band which evolves 
around a central parity that may possibly but not necessarily be recalculated, 
but most importantly having the clear capability o f being enlarged or restricted 
according to the perceived credibility of policy actions. The policymaker would 
remain firm in his commitment to maintain that band which is deemed to be 
sustainable given his degree of credibility.
The AGS model starts from the recognition that full credibility cannot be 
assumed but it has to be earned as the result of the explicit proof of the com­
mitment by the policy maker to actively pursue actions at all times which will 
keep the exchange rate within the band.2 There are essentially three additional 
elements that are introduced beyond the standard target zone model:
1. the strategic interaction between the policy maker and the markets and 
the dynamics of credibility;
2. the recognition that external shocks may warrant the temporary adoption 
of more flexibility than that imposed by a rigid target zone;
3. the need for learning by the financial markets about the policy maker’s 
actions and hence credibility in an uncertain world.
The endogenization of credibility in the AGS model revolves around the 
distinction between absolute and relative credibility. Absolute credibility is re­
lated to the level of exchange rate stabilization that the policy maker wants to
2In this section we are only able to give a brief overview of Avesani, Gallo and Salmon 




























































































(or can) achieve through the announcement of a bandwidth around a central 
parity value. The initial announcement corresponds to a commitment to direct 
policy, both inside the band and at the margins, with the objective of keep­
ing the exchange rate within the announced limits given the shocks hitting the 
system. The announcement also forms the yardstick against which the mar­
kets evaluate those policy actions. Zero absolute credibility corresponds to no 
target zone and hence represents a free-float regime; full absolute credibility 
is the tightest band manageable and we assume is enforced by some external 
commitment or institutional agreement.
In this framework, any exchange rate regime can be characterized by a 
bandwidth corresponding to a solution for the exchange rate. For a given level 
of the fundamentals k, the solution for the exchange rate can be characterized as 
as a convex combination of the institutional commitment regime, hence perfectly 
credible, gpc(k) and the free-float g jj{k ) solution:
gw(k) = w g pc(k) +  ( l - w ) g f f {k). (2)
The higher the degree of exchange rate stabilization desired, the higher will be 
the weight on the institutional agreement path, and vice versa. In the presence 
of a need for flexibility, though, the policy maker may want to deviate from 
the announcement and he could do so in two ways; given a certain level of 
fundamentals and a desire to accomodate some domestic shock, he could choose 
a less stabilizing path corresponding to an implicitly wider band-width (devious 
behavior). The second class of actions is to behave as if the band-width in place 
were tighter (virtuous behavior) and in this way he may invest in his stock of 
credibility perhaps for later use.
Relative credibility reflects the degree of confidence the markets hold in 
the initially announced band or effectively the corresponding value of w when 
comparing the observed behavior of the exchange rate and the behavior that 
would be in place were the policy maker to continually adhere to the announced 
band. In this respect, the announced bandwidth would be fully credible (in a 
relative sense) if the actions of the policy maker were at each point in time 
consistent with the implications of the announced band. Deviating from the 
announcement in the devious direction will be recognized by the markets (al­
though not immediately) as eventually leading to a lack o f sustainability of the 
announced band and will be reflected in a decrease in the relative credibility, 
but will not necessarily be immediately punished by a run on reserves while 




























































































characterised by many such instances, with large swings in the exchange rate 
towards the margins, corresponding to less credibility, yet not all of them forcing 
an immediate realignment of the central parity.
In the opposite case of virtuous behavior, the level of commitment to 
exchange rate stabilization is higher than the one warranted by the announced 
band, and hence is rewarded by an increase in the relative credibility of the 
band itself as the markets adjust their expectations. Again, one can think of 
the experience of the Italian Lira prior to the official tightening of the band at 
the beginning of 1991, when the exchange rate was kept in a tunnel within the 
official band of ±6%  as a way to achieve credibility for the next phase.
In either case the policy maker’s actions signal a deviation from the an­
nouncement, the consequences o f which should be taken immediately into con­
sideration. In the case of devious behavior a (political) cost will be incurred and 
if repeated it may lead to the need for a new bandwidth announcement in line 
with the current reputation of the policy maker. In the case of virtuous behavior 
a political bonus is gained which may eventually if such behaviour is repeated 
lead to the opportunity for the announcement of a tighter bandwidth.In AGS 
we endogenise this process of the evolution of relative credibility while the au­
thorities, recognising their current level of credibility, determine their optimal 
sterilised intervention strategy by trading-off the desire for flexibility against 
potential losses in credibility.
The simplest expression for relative credibility is then just the ratio be­
tween the band width implied by the current observed exchange rate and that 
originally announced. This follows immediately from (2) as:
Figure 1 characterises this nonlinear function in terms of the divergence 
between the observed exchange rate and that expected given the announced 
band. We can see in particular that rc =  1 when s =  ga(k), and rc =  0 for 
s =  gf f  ; a symmetric function holds for the lower part of the band.
relative credibility when he adheres to the (s, k) mapping consistent with the 
initially announced band-width, ie. along the path A (s =  ga(k)) in the left hand 
subpanel of the Figure. Beneath this “s-mapping” he may actually increase his 
credibility as he would be potentially adopting a tighter sterilised intervention or 
monetary policy than required given his initial announcement. Such credibility
wret =  —  
wa
s‘ ~  9ff(kt) _  - st -  ffQ(fct)
(3)




























































































building is important if we wish to consider how policy can be directed towards 
achieving a narrower band. Above the path A, there will be a loss of relative 
credibility, in the region AB, which becomes more dramatic as the exchange 
rate passes over the upper threshold of the announced band, Ua, through B and 
into the region BC. The policy-maker achieves both zero relative and absolute 
credibility when the exchange rate coincides with the free float value.
The level of relative credibility then plays a central role in determining 
the exchange rate in the heterogeneous and atomistic structure assumed for the 
financial markets in the AGS model. This is largely as a result of the effect 
his credibility has on unifying the expectations of the market. Market power 
is initially biased towards the policy maker as a consequence of being a single 
large actor amongst the atomistic private agents in the market and from having 
greater monitoring capabilities given its institutional role. This market power 
however decreases with a decrease in relative credibility and is gradually shifted 
to the private sector to the point of being completely lost when all relative 
credibility is lost. This introduces a degree of asymmetric information between 
the policy maker and the financial markets, since the latter is uncertain about 
both the degree of market power held by the policy maker and his actions.
The strategic interaction between policy maker and the market then occurs 
as in a standard asymmetric information Stackelberg game where all players 
seek to maximize their objective function. The policy maker has to choose 




























































































from the announced band-width depending upon the trade-off seen between 
the advantages from adopting a more flexible policy stance by deviating from 
the announcement and incurring the resulting political costs. This is carried 
out in the AGS model by constructing an objective function in which, apart 
from non-strategic elements related to exchange rate stabilization, both the 
deviation of the level of the exchange rate from central parity and volatility are 
penalised, strategic costs are included associated with the desirability:
• to gain more flexibility than that offered by the existing band;
• of not incurring the political costs that this higher flexibility entails;
• of not being forced through a realignment to a new announcement corre­
sponding to a lower degree of absolute credibility.
Notice that this objective function intimately involves credibility in several 
places and is quite distinct from the standard approach to justifying the opti­
mality of target zones through proportional costs o f intervention. The private 
sector or financial markets on the other hand seek to minimize their prediction 
errors on the level of the exchange rate and this leads to their selection of an 
appropriate expectations formation mechanism.
The realised exchange rate is then determined by the interaction between 
the policy maker and the private sector in the foreign exchange market and is 
critically affected by the assumed general inability of the markets to directly 
observe the monetary authorities’ actions, as pointed out above. Interventions 
are assumed to be fully sterilised and not immediately observable, as often 
seems to be the case in practice, so that the markets face a problem of signal 
extraction, from observations on the observed exchange rate, to determine the 
monetary authorites implicit degree o f relative commitment to the announced 
band. The initial fully credible (in a relative sense) announcement is subject to 
scrutiny by the market, in that the agents try to judge whether the observed 
exchange rate is consistent with the intention to defend the announced band. On 
his part, the policy maker takes into account the private sector’s expectations 
and considers the trade-off between the desire for a greater monetary freedom 
and the political cost that devious behavior brings about. In maximizing the 
objective function, therefore, he chooses an intervention policy corresponding 
to an exchange rate determined by a solution path lying between the free float 
and the institutional commitment solutions and identified by a value for the 




























































































In updating its aggregate expectations, the private sector acknowledges 
that it acts in a highly nonlinear and non -constant environment in which learn­
ing should never be switched off but should be able to track the instability of 
the exchange rate generating mechanism. In the presence o f high credibility the 
markets adjust rapidly to surprises in the perceived band-width, whereas low 
credibility in fact implies less information on policy preferences as the market 
power of the policy maker has been eroded. To put it differently, the policy 
maker has to engage in proportionally greater effort to re-establish its reputa­
tion when its relative credibility is low, than when his relative credibility is close 
to high.
An initial endowment o f credibility is granted to the policy maker, mea­
sured by the horizontal distance from the tangency point of the S-shaped curve 
to a free-float regime and corresponds to the amount of fundamental adjust­
ment or speculative attack which would bring about an immediate collapse of 
the announced target zone. A  stagewise game is then repeated with the pol­
icy maker cumulating the political costs that result from devious and virtuous 
behavior. If an initial endowment of credibility is completely depleted, the an­
nounced band-width is no longer seen to be sustainable, and an enlargement of 
the band is needed (higher weight given to the free-float solution in (2)). The 
level chosen for the new announcement (new absolute credibility) is set at the 
bandwidth which was perceived by the markets as being that currently effective. 
This ensures that there are no jumps in expectations, nor in exchange rates, 
and hence the relative credibility function is reset to one and a new credibility 
endowment is available to the policy maker.
3 Alternative Measures of Credibility and the 
Crisis in the ERM  in 1993
In this section we analyse the experience of the French Franc within the ERM 
from the end of October 1991 to mid-August 1993 and compare the evolution of 
credibility as measured by press reports to the measure of credibility proposed 
by Svensson (1991) and that derived from the AGS model discussed above. The 
behavior of the FF/DM  deviations from central parity is shown in Figure 2. For 





























































































3.1 The French Franc Behavior from Press Accounts.
One way of judging the credibility of an exchange rate band ex post is to recon­
struct the market feelings as reported by the press, in our case The Economist, 
which is taken here to express the views of a well-informed agent.
Starting from the beginning o f 1992 and stopping at the end of July 1993 
(when the French Franc was forced to an enlargement of the bands to ±15% ), 
we can isolate four main phases in the French Franc/Deutsche Mark relation­
ship. The first lasts until the end of June 1992 with a strengthening of the 
Franc towards the central parity. It is interesting to note that this occurred 
in the presence o f a stable short term interest rate differential between DM 
and FF denominated Eurodeposits around 50 basis points (bp) with the long 
term differential constantly increasing from 35-40 bp at the beginning of 1992 
to 135-140 bp during the summer.
The second phase starts in July 1992 when the FF/DM  weakened rapidly 
moving toward the upper limit of the ERM band. Short term interest rates 
became more volatile and the interest differential spread to more than 700 bp 
during the ’92 crisis which forced the British Pound and the Italian Lira out 
of the ERM. The reason for this deterioration vis-a-vis the DM have been 
widely credited to the tight monetary conditions imposed by the German mon­
etary authorities during the summer of ’92. The official rates were locked until 
September 15 (right after the crisis) when the Bundesbank cut the discount 
rate by 50 bp to 8.25% and the Lombard 25 bp to 9.5%. During this period 
the FF/D M  exchange rate fluctuated violently inside the band and the tensions 
were transfered to the short term rates and to an increased volatility in long 
term rates.
The third phase starts at the beginning of January 1993. In particular, the 
FF/DM  exchange rate which was at the limit of maximum allowed depreciation 
recovered the losses (after Feb. 4 the German main intervention rates were cut 
by 25 bp, a move interpreted as a sign of the easing of monetary conditions), and 
moved rapidly toward and below the central parity, after a period of uncertainty 
surrounding the March elections. In the meanwhile the spreads on short and 
long term rates with respect to Germany also shrank to zero. Uncertainty 
still existed about the attitude of the new government towards monetary and 
fiscal issues and the reform of the Banque de France in a direction o f greater 
independence in line with the Maastricht Treaty. The formation of the new 
cabinet saw the appointment of two strong supporters of European integration 




























































































the first measures adopted by the new government, the budget (May 10th -  
recognized as a tough one by The Economist) and the BdF reform plan sent 
a clear signal of commitment to the Maastricht Treaty and brought the short 
term interest rate differential in favor of the FF and the long term differential 
towards zero.
All these actions had the effect of dissipating the political fears that char­
acterised the pre-election debate on the future course of French monetary policy. 
It seems however that while the uncertainties relating to the political will of the 
new French government disappeared, uncertainties hinging on the economic 
feasibility of the high interest rate policy seem have remained. In fact, doubts 
concerning the tenability of the monetary policy in face o f deteriorating expec­
tations on GDP growth and unemployment had been a constant in the press 
before and after the elections.
The fourth phase starts in the second half of June when the French key 
intervention rate was lowered by 25 bp below the German discount rate to 7% 
(June 21st). While the FF was strengthening towards the edge of the band3 
the Bundesbank started to ease monetary conditions on July 1st, by cutting the 
discount rate by 50 bp to 6.75% and the Lombard rate by 25 bp to 8.25%. At the 
same time BdF was not able to match the Bundesbank and cut the intervention 
rate by only 25 bp. The hierarchy inside the ERM was reestablished and the 
market was left wondering whether the Banque de France had overstreched its 
position.
As usual market computations and reactions are fast and not always com­
pletely understandable being a mixture of short and long term forecasts, tech­
nical evaluations and an expression of animal spririts. Ex post we can say that 
the market looked at the following issues. First of all the market was disturbed 
by the emphasis with which the French government was pushing the issue of 
the low inflation rate. At the time the French inflation rate was half that in 
Germany, but the reverse had been true for the previous 20 years, and thus 
a different anti-inflationary reputation had been established in the two coun­
tries. Secondly, the fact that France was not able to match the Bundesbank 
interest rates cut and restablish the differential in her favour was interpreted 
as a sign of weakness. It was known that France needed to follow a fast track 
in cutting rates since there were worsening expectations for growth and unem­
ployment plus a growing pressure from right wing politicians to follow a more 
independent monetary policy and abandon the Franc fort policy.
3There was even some talk of the need for the DM to devalue, or for adding or substituting 




























































































Finally, in the second half of July the situation worsened very quickly: the 
Franc moved to the upper limit of the band and the short term interest differ­
ential reached 6%. It is by now generally acknowledged that the uncooperative 
behavior of the Bundesbank, which did not fulfill the expectations of further 
cuts before the summer recess, forced Belgium, France, Denmark, and Portu­
gal to raise interest rates to defend their currencies. During the weekend of 
July 31st and August 1st, after a week of strong speculation against the French 
Franc counteracted only by the BdF interventions in the forex, the ±15%  band 
enlargement is announced.
3.2 Svensson’s “Simplest Measure of Target Zone Cred-
Svensson (1991) starts from the consideration of uncovered interest rate parity 
and of the exchange rate return over r  periods:
where i\ T is the nominal foreign interest rate at time t for a r  maturity and St is 
the exchange rate at time t. He shows that if limits of fluctuations are imposed 
on the exchange rate of the kind S. <  St < S, an implicit band is imposed on 
the rate of return as well, R < R [ < R ,  defined as
Since the tensions on the exchange rate market are passed onto the interest 
rate, one should see the exchange rate return move outside its implied band 
prior to a realignment. The reverse argument does not, however always prove 
to be the case. In fact in the case of the French Franc for the period under 
examination the evidence regarding the rate of return for the Eurodeposit one- 
month maturity (shown in Figure 3) shows that apart from sporadic signals in 
late 1991, the period around the September 1992 crisis is characterized by a 
breech in the upper limit which lasted almost two months. While it was clear 
that the French Franc was under attack, the crisis did not lead to a realignment. 
Similarly the five-month period marked by an exchange rate return above the 
upper limit in late 1992 and early 1993, as we have seen from the press accounts, 
was actually marked by fluctuating periods in which the French Franc gained 






























































































according to the Svensson’s measure, the loss of credibility in the final period 
would originate somewhat around June 13, when the return hovers around the 
upper bound and breaks it around June 21 with a sudden downward shift in 
the bands following on July 1st (when German rates are cut).
3.3 Measuring Credibility according to the AGS Model
To apply the AGS model to measure the level of Relative Credibility over the 
relevant period we start by assuming the level of absolute credibility correspond­
ing to the announced ±2.25% band which in turn implies a weight of wa =  0.78 
in the convex combination between the institutional commitment and the free 
floating regime. As there were no realignments for the French Franc until the 
crisis of the end of July 1993, we keep this announcement as fixed in our analysis.
In order to extract the measure of relative credibility for the historical 
exchange rate, we face the problem of only having available the series of observed 
daily deviations from the central parity. Recall that relative credibility is a 
function of the difference between observed exchange rate and the exchange 
rate that would be observed if the policy maker completely adhered to the 
implications of the announcement. Under a flexible set of actions followed by 
the monetary authorities, the observed exchange rate would correspond to the 
outcome in the AGS model of the policy maker’s optimization process and of 
the interaction between the policy maker and the markets. The “fundamentals” 
that gave rise to the observed exchange rate series are however not observed and 
now need to be estimated to get an operational measure of relative credibility. 
Once this estimated series is available we are in the position of deriving the 
exchange rate which would be perfectly consistent with the announcement, and 
hence of deriving the estimate of the relative credibility for the period under 
examination.
The chosen estimation strategy is by simulation in which, for a given set 
of parameters for the underlying fundamentals process, we can simulate paths 
of daily deviations from the central parity starting from the historical value 
on Oct. 30, 1991 where according to the AGS model at each period a new 
band width is implicitly chosen by the policy maker through his actions and 
the market expectations are updated.
We then retain, from a large set of generated paths only those that show 
the need for a new announcement on or about Aug. 2, 1993 (a leeway of 7 




























































































political cost has passed the threshold which triggers such an announcement. 
For each replicated path we started at full relative credibility and at zero cu­
mulated political cost. The estimator of the unobserved series is that which 
minimizes
X  (st -  3™(fct ) )2 (6 )
t=1
i.e. the mean square error between the historical series and the simulated ex­
change rate as the outcome of the optimization process. From the optimal path 
we are able to invert the mapping onto the fundamentals kt to estimate the im­
plied fundamantals and hence retrieve the estimate for the exchange rate that 
would be consistent with the announced path sa(kt). The outcome is shown in 
Figure 4 where the historical and the announcement-consistent deviations from 
central parity are superimposed on each other. There are no extended periods 
of coincidence between the two paths, with days when the difference is positive 
(signalling that flexibility is exploited and political cost incurred) leading to a 
loss in relative credibility and periods of virtuous behavior characterized by a 
negative difference and a gain in relative credibility.
For the estimated path, the relative credibility function can be computed 
for each day and is shown in Figure 5: we can observe various periods when 
it exceeds unity. In particular, we can see a big loss in relative credibility 
corresponding to the September 1992 crisis which is rapidly neutralised. The 
switching between gains and losses of credibility, mentioned above, at the end 
of 1992 and up to the spring of 1993 (which is in line with the press reports) 
and a raise in credibility from April ’93 to the end of May or beginning o f June 
is also consistent with the press evidence.
According to our estimates, then, one would notice a rapid loss in cred­
ibility in mid-June which corresponds to the French decision to lower the key 
intervention rate below the corresponding German rate, an episode which is 
detected also by Svensson’s measure. The novelty is that relative credibility 
lingers (contrary to prior episodes) around low levels and corresponds to the 
accumulation of political cost. The widening of the band is triggered in our es­
timation by the political cost passing over the threshold as shown in the Figure 
6.4 *When one looks at this last figure one realizes that the estimated cumulated
4In fact the cumulated political cost is shown as the ratio to the threshold and is thus set 
between the values (-1,1). When the value of 1 is reached then an enlargement of the band
is required and a tightening is possible when the value of -1 is reached. Recall that the level





























































































political cost had been steadily growing since the beginning o f March, and that 
the policy actions of April and May (cabinet formation, budget and reform plan 
for the BdF) had just temporarily held back that tendency. The level of per­
ceived credibility at the point of crisis is estimated as w  =  0.24 and corresponds 
to a band width of ±7.9%  which would have been the optimal level suggested by 
our analysis as an expectation-compatible enlargement o f the band (see Figure 
2 to observe the behaviour of the exchange rate after the crisis). The institu­
tionally chosen ±15%  band corresponds in our calculations to w =  0.06, giving 
rise to a solution which thus places almost all weight on the free-float regime.
The results of the estimation process seem to be quite reassuring in that 
they show that optimizing behavior in which flexibility is explicitly taken into 
account as in the AGS model appears to be consistent with the historical evi­
dence for the French Franc in the period leading up to the 1993 crisis in which 
the band-widths in the ERM were widened as predicted by the flexible target 
zone model. Previous crises are shown (cf. Figure 6) to have come close to 
the trigger point that would force a realignment but the cumulative political 
costs fell back (several times sizeably) corresponding to a recovery of relative 
credibility in the initial band-width announcement.
4 Conclusion
It would seem that the operation and structure of the ERM was eventually, 
if not initially, determined by motives other than simply stabilising currency 
fluctuations. The additional desire to impose convergence on the participating 
economies prior to European Monetary Union set a constraint on the system 
that it was eventually unable to bear and it was quite simply not designed 
to achieve these objectives. The policy coordination role explicitly recognised 
within the Maastricht Treaty appears to have taken a secondary role and the 
burden for achieving coordination and convergence was laid on the ERM. We 
have not considered in this paper how the equilibrium or central parity should 
be set which we see as being ultimately determined by these higher order issues 
relating to the international coordination of economic policy. Nevertheless we 
do feel that our analysis provides a clear explanation for the collapse of the ERM 
through its open loop commitment and suggests how it might be reformed by a 
more flexible optimally managed system within which policy coordination may 
be explicitly developed to achieve economic convergence should that be what is 




























































































through an exchange rate target zone alone whether it be flexible or rigid.
The critical element of the AGS model lies in the incorporation of relative 
credibility into the policy formulation process of the monetary authorities. The 
nature of the commitment made by the policy maker then reflects both his clear 
intention to continuously maintain the exchange rate inside the announced band 
but also the reality of the need to respond to temporary shocks that may en­
tail greater flexibility than originally permitted by the announced target zone. 
Pressure created by non-convergence in the fundamentals must be resolved by 
coordination and the appropriate adjustment of the central parity. The flexible 
target zone proposal can then be seen as the implementation of a reputation 
sustained feedback strategy rather than the open loop precommitment found 
in the ERM and Bretton Woods. Alternatively it represents a half way house 
between complete discretion or leaning against the wind, as discussed by Svens- 
son [1992], and open loop strategies that are periodically forced through crises 
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